Private agencies for public purposes: some new perspectives on policy making in health insurance between the wars.
The approved societies, who were charged with the administration of health insurance in Britain, have long been blamed for the failure of the scheme to expand its coverage or scope in the interwar period. This paper takes a closer look at the administrative process and argues that societies were more vulnerable to central regulation than is commonly thought and were unable to resist cuts in public subsidies and extensions in liability introduced at their expense. They provided a convenient scapegoat for policies emanating primarily from the economic orthodoxy subscribed to by both government and the Treasury, modified to protect the unemployed during the slump. Health insurance policy was dominated to a large extent by the Government Actuary, who aimed to guarantee the cost effectiveness of the scheme. This paper also shows how administrative definitions and practices affected the classification of claimants to state social insurance at this time. It re-establishes the major weaknesses of the system, arguing that--in the light of recent discussions about reviving a system of national health insurance--we have much to learn from looking again at the experience of the interwar period.